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8Abstract:
This is an analytical study which aims to gauge the extent to which 
international treaties have been effective in directing foreign investment 
to Iran. The two types of treaties studied here include Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Agreements. Data as to the 
amount of investment in Iran as well as some information regarding the 
domestic investment regulatory framework in Iran is presented. The 
country has experienced widely different attitudes towards investment in 
the last 30 years because of its domestic political changes and, of course, 
in response to international developments. Upon recovering from the 
initial nationalistic shock of the 1979 revolution, Iran has engaged in 
many international instruments in the last 15 years and has also made 
several changes to its domestic fiscal and investment laws to provide 
foreign investors with a more favourable investment climate. These 
attempts have partly succeeded in the sense that there has generally been 
an upward trend in the amount of foreign investment channelled to Iran 
since 1994. This amount, however, is still much lower than is the norm 
for a country of the size and natural resources of Iran. Through 
investigating different impediments to foreign investment in the country, 
the study finds that overwhelmingly political and non-legal factors such 
9as the relationship between Iran and the West and the attitude of the 
Iranian administrations to international trade carry much greater weight 
than merely concluding treaties. Despite this, the number of treaties 
concluded could be a good indicator of the political climate of the 
country at any given time and it can be seen that the government’s plans 
for attraction of foreign investment have always been clearly more 
successful throughout periods when more treaties were signed.
Key words:
Foreign direct investment in Iran, Bilateral investment treaties, 
Double taxation treaties, impediments to foreign investment in Iran, 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Iran
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Introduction: 
Foreign investment is held to play a vital role as far as economic growth 
is concerned. Most studies reveal a significant endogenous relationship 
between FDI and economic growth; foreign direct investment among all 
types has been established to have the strongest impact of all1 . We 
should add to this the positive externalities of such investment such as 
transfer of technology. Most developing countries need to compete for 
foreign investment as they lack the necessary financial resources 
internally. However, as historical records indicate, developing countries 
have not exactly been safe havens for foreign investors and very many 
disputes have historically arisen out of cases in which developing 
countries were involved as the host country.
The means of attracting foreign investment are not exclusively legal and 
include a wide array of subjects such as political stability, a high 
standard of security and of course a favourable tax regime. However, 
legal steps towards attracting foreign investment have usually involved 
concluding international treaties with Capital exporting states as well as 
making reforms to the domestic legal and tax regimes thus turning them 
                                                
1 Robert, E. Lipsey, (1999). “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in International Capital Flow”
NBER Working Paper No. 7094.
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into a more favourable setting for international investors. On the 
international level, a wide range of international treaties are possible. 
Two main types are bilateral investment treaties and double taxation 
treaties.2 Bilateral investment treaties are by far the commonest types of 
such treaties usually, but not exclusively, concluded between developing 
and developed countries which mainly aim to grant foreign investors, 
national to the treaty countries, more assurance as to the security and 
protection of their investment. They also aim to grant them access to fair 
dispute settlement mechanisms.
 However, from a perspective, through concluding a BIT a developing 
country is in fact making a compromise on its sovereignty in the hope 
that they can achieve a questionably more important end which is 
attracting foreign investment. Intriguingly, BITs are effectively based on 
principles that developing countries have long been historically objecting 
to 3 . Another widespread international instrument, most commonly 
referred to as double taxation agreements, could also be a part of a 
government’s scheme to create a more attractive climate for investment. 
                                                
2 It should be noted that treaties with an aim to encourage foreign investment are really diverse and 
these two are merely chosen as common types that many countries have used as an instrument to 
encourage foreign investment. Other treaty types may include: Trade treaties, preferential trade
treaties, bilateral customs agreements, treaties on foreign investment aid etc.
3 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “The Economics of Bilateral Investment. Treaties”, Harvard International 
Law journal 41 , (2000): 469.
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Nevertheless, in a DTT as is usually the case, developing countries, as 
investment importing countries often have to forgo part of their tax 
revenue so as to provide incentive for foreigners to make investments 
within their territory. 
Iran, particularly as an oil producing country, is in crying need for big 
amounts of foreign investment especially in its energy sector, mainly to 
expand or even maintain its current oil and gas production level. 
Attracting foreign investment has becoming one of the main sources of 
funding for the governments of Iran in the previous 15 years. There have 
been sweeping changes made to the domestic regulatory framework of 
the country and many of the previously burdensome regulations have 
been reformed. In fact, the country enjoys a much more investment 
friendly atmosphere than it previously did. On the international level also, 
there have been developments; Iran has shown more inclination towards 
investment relevant international treaties and has signed quite a lot of 
these treaties as well. Despite the evident increase, however, there is 
debate as to whether these measures have been fully effective or not. It is 
argued that the amount of foreign investment channelled to Iran is still 
relatively insignificant considering international standards. This 
13
proposition holds true when the larger picture is looked at, but a closer 
look at the trend of foreign investment reveals that there have been 
fluctuations and a chronological study can best capture the essence of 
these variations.
This study aims to assess the effectiveness of the two mentioned
international instruments for attracting foreign investment. The focus of 
the study, despite covering much information on international investment, 
would geographically lie on Iran and, therefore, a great deal of 
information about the climate of foreign investment in the country is 
deemed essential.
14
Research Questions:
The study attempts to find answers to four main questions:
1. Is foreign investment an effective factor in terms of economic growth 
and development? (Literature Review)
2. Do bilateral investment treaties and double taxation agreements
encourage foreign investment? (Literature Review)
3. Has Iran experienced a noticeable increase in FDI since it started 
concluding such agreements in the 1990s and, if so,can these increases, 
if any, be attributed to the mentioned treaties?
4. How could Iran meet its need for FDI and what are the impediments to 
attraction of foreign investment in Iran? 
15
Methodology and chapters:
This is an analytical study with its focus mainly on Iran. It is not an 
empirical study, but reference is regularly made to findings of other 
surveys of economic nature. The first chapter lays the ground work by 
addressing the first questions of the study through a brief review of the 
relevant literature. The concept of foreign direct investment and its links 
with economic growth are looked into. As well as this a number of 
factors that could influence FDI inflows will be briefly highlighted is a 
short section.
The second chapter focuses on Iran and starts by giving a rather detailed 
historical account of foreign investment in Iran. The historical study is 
organized in a chronological order with due regard for particular political 
features of each time era. Data as to the state of foreign investment in 
Iran is presented in Graphs and tables at the end of this chapter. Along 
with this, the basis of the domestic regulatory and legal framework of the 
country concerning foreign investment will be introduced.
In the third chapter, international treaties used to attract foreign 
investment are discussed. Apart from introducing the two relevant 
international instruments namely BIT and DTT, information regarding 
the treaties signed by Iran will be provided.
16
In the Fourth and final chapter, the main impediments to foreign 
investment in Iran are listed and expounded duly. Finally, a conclusion 
will follow to sum up the study and answer the research questions 
specifically. Recommendations are also made as to what measures the 
government should take so as to maximize its FDI inflows.
17
Chapter one:  Foreign direct investment
1-1.Definition of foreign direct investment:
The Encyclopaedia of public international law defines investment as ‘a 
transfer of funds or materials from one country (called capital exporting 
country) to another country (called host country) in return for a direct or 
indirect participation in the earnings of that enterprise’. This definition 
has been criticized as too broad.4
 UNCTAD 1999 defines FDI as ‘an investment involving a long term 
relationship and reflecting lasting interest and control of a resident entity 
in one economy in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that 
of the foreign direct investment’ 5 . Very similarly, the International 
Monetary fund’s Balance of payments manual  defines FDI as ‘an 
investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise
operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor’s 
purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the 
enterprise’6. These latter two definitions aim to clearly exclude portfolio 
                                                
4 M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment, (United Kingdom, Cambridge 
university press, 2004), 7.
5 UNCTAD “World Investment Report: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of 
Development” (1999) (New York: United Nations).
6 M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 8.
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investment through using words such as ‘control’ and ‘controlling 
interest’.  
Foreign direct investment should include a transfer of property from one 
country to another. In the case of portfolio investment, however, there is 
no participation in management of a company and, therefore, not as 
much risk is borne by the foreign investor.
 Historically, the definition of the term investment has grown broader in 
the course of time initially through the inclusion of intangible property. 
The inclusion of company shares in the definition of investment in many 
bilateral treaties following the Barcelona Traction 7  case has risen 
questions as to whether  portfolio investment should be included in the 
protection awarded by bilateral investment treaties or not, which is still a 
matter for debate. 
1-2.A short history of FDI: 
There is a long history of FDI in Europe going back to very early times. 
Initially, two main doctrines evolved one stressing national treatment for 
foreign investors another requiring an international standard which is, 
amusingly, still a heated controversy.8  In modern history particularly 
                                                
7 (ICJ) case, Belgium v. Spain (1970).
8  M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 21.
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beginning in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century,  foreign 
investment often took the shape of Britain financing the economic 
development of other countries and was merely a form of colonial 
expansion. During that time, there was no need for an investment law 
because of the integration of the colonial legal systems.9 Outside this 
colonial context, power played a crucial role; Britain lost its status as the 
main global creditor to the United States in the interwar period as the US 
started becoming a world power. Another development in the same era 
was the decline in international trade and the proportional increase in 
direct investment. Prior to the World War II, the need for the 
development of some international law doctrine was felt in the context of 
American investment in Latin American countries which involved many 
clashes. After the world war the amount of foreign direct investment 
grew sharply in the world mainly because there was a great need for 
foreign capital in the severely damaged European countries as well as 
Japan. This need was mostly met by the US. Another reason for this 
growth was technological achievements which made international 
investments much more easily feasible.10 US remained the world leading 
                                                
9  Ibid, 19.
10 . Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice, (2002, Palgrave 
publication, United Kingdom), 17.
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capital exporter until 1980s when it itself became a big recipient of FDI 
mainly from Japan and Germany. An important development in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century was an increase in the share of FDI 
directed to less developed countries. Akrami Moghadam (2000) cites 
three main reasons for this increase:
1. The pressing need of developing countries for foreign investment.
2. A change in the mindset and the attitudes of the developing countries 
towards foreign investment.
3. Globalization of products and services. 
In fact, FDI worldwide  increased from 14 percent in 1980 to 26 percent 
in 199711. Despite the increase, the distribution of FDI between the less 
developed countries is not even and not all of them have captured a big 
significant share.
1-3. Determinants of FDI: 
To find out why FDI is likely to be channelled to certain regions and 
countries and not equally to others can only be described if effective 
factors in attracting FDI are known. These factors are those that Multi 
                                                                                                                                         
11
Leyla sarafraz, “Economic Reforms and Foreign Direct Investment in Iran”
REPEC working papers May 2002,  http://mpra.ub.uni-uenchen.de/1480. 
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National Companies (MNC) take into consideration when making 
investment decisions. Since investment is a long term and costly process, 
MNCs consider numerous economic and country specific criteria when 
weighing up their investment options.12  There have been changes in the 
trends and important factors and incidentally those that have become 
increasingly more important are those that contribute more to economic 
growth.13
These factors have generally been categorized into five broad classes:
“1. General policy factors (e.g. political stability, privatisation)
2. Specific FDI policies (incentives, performance requirements, 
investment promotion, international trade and investment treaties)
3.  Macro economic factors (human resources, infrastructure, market size 
and growth)
4. Firm specific factors (e.g. technology). ”14
The present study mainly deals with general policy factors, which 
include national policy decisions, and specific FDI policies which entail
                                                
12
Jason Lewis,  "Factors Influencing Foreign Direct Investment in Lesser Developed Countries" The 
Park Place Economist: 8(2000).
13
Dirk Willem te Velde, “Foreign Direct Investment and Development
An historical perspective” 2006, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/594.pdf. 
14 Ibid.
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changes made to the domestic legal and fiscal framework in Iran as well 
as investment treaties.
It seems that among Macro economic factors market size and human 
resources are the most important ones; (Obadan 1982; Anyanwu’s 1998; 
Iyoha 2001) all doing case studies on Nigeria, find market size and 
technological infrastructure to be the most important determinants in 
attracting FDI . However, (Dinda 2009) emphasizes the increasingly 
important role of natural resource wealth and trade partners for attraction 
of foreign investment. This is confirmed by the findings of (Asiedu 2002, 
2006).
1-4.Effects of FDI on economic growth:
The views on the effects of FDI on an economy are incredibly diverse 
including a very wide spectrum on one side of which it is considered as a 
form of new colonialism, while on the other it is thought to be absolutely 
indispensable to the economy of the host state.15
The states which participated in the Paris Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, held in 1963-1964, acknowledged that foreign 
                                                
15
Xiaoying Li, Xiaming Liu, “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth:
An Increasingly Endogenous Relationship”, World  Development 33, no 3(2005): 393.
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private investment inflows play a crucial complementary role in the 
process of economic development, especially through “the transfer of 
resources, managerial and administrative expertise and technology to the 
developing countries, the expansion of productive capacity and 
employment in those countries and the establishment of export 
markets.”16
What makes FDI unique is that it continues to expand even when the 
world trade is down. Unlike portfolio investment, FDI does not suffer a 
serious decrease as a result of many financial crises.17 In fact, FDI has 
been the least volatile among international investment sources. 18
Foreign direct investment is thought to bring about numerous benefits to 
the host state. In general several studies (Caves, 1974; Kokko, 1994; 
Oulton, 1998; Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999; Xu 2000) confirm that 
there is a positive correlation between FDI and productivity. (Blomstrom 
et al. 1996) finds that FDI leaves a strong positive effect on economic 
growth.  (Xiaoying Li and Xiaming Liu 2004) finds an endogenous 
                                                
16Department of Economic & Social Affairs (Editor) United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, ( United Nations Publications, 2001), 23.
17
Imad A. Moosa. Foreign Direct Investment; Theory, evidence and practice, 16-18.
However, this appears to be contestable. For example, During the Argentina crisis in 2000 the FDI did 
suffer and generally global FDI movements plunge during global financial crises. 
18
Robert. E. Lipsey. The role of FDI in international capital flows. 
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relationship between FDI and economic growth using a panel of 84 
countries during 1970-1999. It should be noted, however, that (Laura 
Alfaro 2003) using a cross country panel  finds that FDI growth affects 
the primary, manufacturing and service sectors differently; while FDI 
growth in the primary sector impacts the economy negatively, there is a 
positive impact in the case of manufacturing and an ambiguous effect 
when services are concerned. Besides, some studies find that FDI has a 
potentially greater effect on economically developed countries compared 
to less developed countries.19
In addition to providing direct capital financing, FDI can produce 
positive externalities such as technological spill-over for the host state. 
However, again these positive externalities may be conditional upon the 
development of financial markets and the level of education in the 
country20.  In summary, most economic models attach much value to 
foreign investment.21
An investigation of the growth of investment in recent years especially 
the last two decades signifies that developing countries have come to 
accept the positive effects of investment on their economy so much so 
                                                
19  Laura Alfaro and others. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Growth? Exploring the Role of 
Financial Markets on Linkages” http://www.people.hbs.edu/lalfaro/fdiandlinkages.pdf.
20 ibid.
21 Hooshang Amir Ahmadi, Weiping Wu,  “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, The 
Journal of Developing Areas” 28(January 1994) :167.
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that the growth of foreign investment has been much faster than the 
growth of international trade or international products.22 From 1980 to 
1997 foreign investment experienced a 13 percent growth in comparison 
with a 7 percent growth in international trade. Less developed countries 
in general lack the resources to advance their development projects. This 
is mainly why most developing countries have competed for FDI 
regardless of the findings of empirical studies; Whether a growth in FDI 
is established empirically to enhance the economy of a country has 
proved to be of very little practical importance for resource rich 
countries with heavy economic dependence on their riches like Iran since 
there are not many other economically viable options. 
                                                
22 Farideh Rahmani, “Encouragement of Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of Political and 
economic information 151-152 , (2000): 164.
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Chapter two: Foreign investment and Iran
2-1.History of foreign direct investment in Iran:
To study the history of foreign investment in Iran systematically, a 
classification can be offered to draw lines between five historically 
distinct eras. 
1. before the revolution (up to the 1979 Revolution)
2. The revolution and war time (1979 to 1993)
3. Reconstruction Period (1993 to 1997)  
4. Economic reforms (1997 to present)
2-1-1.Before the revolution:
The initial precedents of foreign investments in Iran can be traced back 
to the last decades of the nineteenth century when investments were 
mainly made in The Iranian Petroleum and Northern Fishing Industry by 
the British and the Russians respectively. Between the years 1881 and 
1919 more than 27 concessions were granted to Russians and an 
estimated 163.75 million Robles worth of investment was made. 23
                                                
23Hossein,  Daliri, “The History of Foreign Investment in Iran”[in Persian], Aftab website, August 2, 
2008,http://www.aftab.ir/articles/economy_marketing_business/financial_economy/c2c121777109_fo
reign_investment_p1.php.
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During roughly the same period, 1862 to 1913, it was significantly more 
for the other Iranian major commercial partner, Britain, with more than 
217 concessions and an overall of 9.68 million Liras24. However, it was 
during Pahlavi Dynasty and especially in the second Pahlavi’s era that 
the growth of foreign investment in Iran gathered much momentum 
especially as there was optimum political stability, because of the 
establishment of the political dictatorship, it might be claimed25. The 
First Iranian Law encouraging foreign investment was passed in the year 
1955.  The Iranian investment and financial assistance Organization, a 
huge step towards maximizing foreign investment, was established in 
1976. 
Finally, FDI in Iran reached its peak during the oil boom, after the first 
oil shock, between the years 1974 to 1979 when industrial development 
in Iran was expedited. For example, in the year 1975, in terms of the 
proportion of foreign direct investment to GDP the country stood in an 
impressive 49th place among all countries in the world. This compared 
with its 129th place in the year 200326 signifies how important foreign 
investment should have been to the previous regime.   It should be noted 
                                                
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
26 The Globalis indicator , http://www.globalis.gvu.unu.edu.
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that most of the investment during this period was made in industrial 
machinery. However, all this coincided with the Iranian revolution of 
1979 and the fall of Shah. Many have criticized the Shah for his 
economic policies which included admission of huge amounts of foreign 
investment and argued that this could lead to foreign control over the 
economy of the country creating a type of dependence.
2-1-2. the revolution and war period:
The revolution brought about major sweeping changes to the political 
and economic landscape of the country. As far as foreign investment is 
concerned, the nationalization of all mother industries in 1979 by the 
new government, especially given its anti-western attitude, tore down all 
the infrastructure of investment in the country and sent most foreign 
investors packing. Merely a year later, The Iraq-imposed eight-year long 
exhaustive war wreaked havoc on the economy of the country. During 
this phase lasting up to 1994, the state governed economy of Iran 
remained quite alien to foreign investment. This period can be 
characterized by revolutionary idealism and ideological resistance to 
foreign investment; In fact there were pretty much no laws in force
except the nationalization laws which had followed the revolution 
pertaining to foreign investment. During this period, another important 
29
barrier to investment was US-led sanctions and a lack of political 
security because of the war in the country. Most investment in the 
country infrastructure was done by the government without any private 
assistance. The government mainly used Turnkey contracts for its major 
infrastructural projects with foreign partners.27
2-1-3. Reconstruction Period:
It was not until the start of the second stage in 1994, during the 
presidency of Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani that some legal steps were 
taken to attract foreign investment. Namely, the 1993 Budget Act 
legitimized limited amounts of foreign investment 28 . Most of the 
attempts made throughout this period, however, met only with partial 
success mainly because the constitutional ban on private ownership of 
mother industries served as an impediment to attracting foreign 
investment. The Constitutional ban remained in place up until the year 
2002. As well as this, an important development relevant to this field 
took place during the last years of this phase, however almost on the 
other side of the planet; Iran-Libya Sanctions Act was passed in the 
                                                
27
, Nima, Nasrollahi Shahri “The Petroleum Legal  Frame Work of Iran”, 8 China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly 8, no1 (2010), 111-126.  
28 It was in the 1993 Budget Act that the government, for the first time, allowed the NIOC to enter 
into contracts of up to US$2.6 billions with competent foreign companies provided that several 
conditions were met.
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American Congress in 1996. This Act aimed to forbid any investment
exceeding 40 million dollars in the Iranian capital intensive energy 
sector.
 The first signs of pragmatism based on national interest after the 
revolution began to appear during this period. However, given the
national mood of the country after the war, it is now easy to comment 
that, it should have really been an uphill struggle and, as expected, the 
plans faced fierce opposition and resistance from different groups within 
the government body.
2-1-4.Economic Reforms:
The third chronological phase in the history of Iranian investment started 
from the beginning of the presidency term of Mohammad Khatami in the 
year 199729. Major economic and political reforms opened new windows 
of opportunity for foreign investors. The hostilities between Iran and the 
west were lessened and the gap between Iran and the west appeared 
much less wide. However, the Iranian nuclear program was revealed to 
the world during this time and this in itself was enough to distance Iran 
from the West despite maximum cooperation on the part of Iran with the 
International Atomic Agency. 
                                                
29 Khatami was the first and last reformist president of the country. He came to power in the year 1997 
and was elected president for two consecutive terms, 8 years.  
31
There were changes made to the legal investment framework of the 
country; a new law, The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Act (FIPPA) as will be discussed later in this study, was passed.  An 
arbitration law was passed in the parliament and a flow of foreign direct
investment started, however still in very limited amounts compared with 
international standards. The growth of foreign investment in-flows 
gathered much speed and reached its peak in the year 2002.30 It was 
during this time that concluding bilateral investment treaties with foreign 
countries accelerated. More than 29 of these treaties were concluded 
during this era; the pie chart below shows the number of bilateral 
investment treaties that have been concluded during different periods. As 
it can be seen, the majority of the treaties were signed during this era.
This phase can be characterized by modern logical pragmatism as far as 
economic policies are concerned.31
                                                
30 See graph no 3. 
31 Nima Nasrollahi Shahri, “The Petroleum Legal Frame Work of Iran”. 
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It was during the same era that the majority of the treaties with OECD 
countries were concluded. The number of bilateral investment treaties 
between Iran and the OECD countries during different eras can be seen 
in the chart
Graph 1 
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2-1-5. Current times:
 The urge of the Iranian government to attract foreign investment 
survived President Khatami and the next governments followed suit. 
However, as can be seen in the graph number 3, the rate of FDI growth 
slowed and even became negative at a period. Besides, the conclusion of 
BITs also slackened off and there have been no more than three of them 
signed since 2005.
Graph 2 
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It should be noted that the policies of the Ahmadi Nejad administration, 
as far as foreign investment is concerned, have been, to a great extent, 
along the same lines as the previous administration. In fact, most of 
differences have had to do with the management of internal affairs of the 
country as well as foreign policy and there are not many economic 
policy differences.  
However, dissatisfactory records of FDI during the last five years should
probably be ascribed mainly to political tensions and partly the global 
recession rather than a legal change of mindset.
Many of the revolutionary ideologies and the xenophobia which existed 
after the revolution have been revived but it would be premature to 
decide whether the rise of  Ahmadi Nejad justifies the creation of a new 
stage or not. This will depend on how far the administration policies will 
ultimately depart from the previous pragmatic governments.
What render the contemporary time quite complicated is the ever
increasing unilateral sanctions which were mainly in response to the 
Iranian controversial nuclear issue. The sanctions admittedly have kept 
many foreign investors at bay and have reduced foreign investment at 
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least outside the energy sector to a trickle.32 Even in the Iranian energy 
sector, current Iranian partners such as China and Russia are mainly 
willing to invest only in the profitable upstream oil projects. In addition 
to this, China does not have the top notch technological expertise to help 
Iran sustain the development of its oilfields.33 Iran is in much need of 
foreign investment in its oil industry even to maintain the same level of 
oil production. Oil consumption in Iran is increasing sharply as the 
population grows and as the production has not increased in the last few 
years the amount of oil export is likely to drop; most Iranian oil fields 
are depleted and the cost of production is on the rise34 and there has been 
very little investment for exploration of new fields. Considering the 
increasing domestic consumption of Iran, should this trend continue, Iran 
may even one day become a net importer of crude oil in some years. Iraq, 
the Iranian western neighbour, has started its ambitious programs to 
elevate its production to more than 10 million barrels per day in a few 
                                                
32  Palash R. Ghosh “While Iran's President Assails Western capitalism, His Country Reels” 
International Business Times, 23 September 2010,  
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/65146/20100923/iran-sanctions-economy-gdp-inflation.htm.
33 ibid.
34 Oil and gasoline are heavily subsidized in Iran. Therefore, not only does a rise in domestic 
consumption deprives the government of export revenue, but it also creates a heavy burden on the 
Iranian government for subsidization. However, there are plans to gradually remove energy subsidies 
which seem to be a response to high consumption and high unnecessary government expenditures.
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years threatening the position of Iran among OPEC members. As for gas, 
the picture is by no means rosier. The Iranian production is almost as 
much as its domestic consumption; this, considering its possession of the 
second biggest gas reserves in the world, is downright disastrous. The 
gas industry is very capital intensive and finding a market is of crucial 
importance since gas storage is neither practically feasible nor 
economically viable. The Buyback contractual regime has not appealed 
to foreign investors35 and the sanctions have accentuated foreign firms’ 
unwillingness to make investments in the Iranian gas sector. The Iranian 
LNG program has also recently been abandoned not meeting with much
enthusiasm on the part of foreign investors.
2-2. Investment in Iran (Figures and statistics)
What renders studying the Iranian investment records a demanding task 
is substantial differences between the statistics given by domestic and 
foreign sources. As well as that, the government is always trying to paint 
a rosy picture of the Iranian economy even if that involves modifying the 
statistics unfairly.36 In an attempt to exaggerate the government’s success 
                                                
35 Shiravi, A., Ebrahimi, N., 2006. “Exploration and Development of Iran's Oilfields Through 
Buyback”, Natural Resource Forum30, (2006): 199.
36 In Iran, there are no independent organs for collecting statistical data and there is governmental 
monopoly on statistics. As an example, the government has not announced the GDP growth for the 
last two years. 
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in attracting investment, in the year 2007 the data given to the media for 
FDI inflow to Iran was the amount of foreign investment approved by 
the government and not the actual investment made in the country. As a 
result, the amount of foreign investment announced by Iran in that year 
was over ten times more than the amount published in the UNCTAD 
world investment report37.
In the year 1994 when Iran started attracting foreign investment there 
was merely no more than $ 284,000 of investment. This figure increased 
to more than a billion dollars in the year 2001 and reached the highest in 
the history of the country, over three billion and a half, in the year 2002. 
Until the year 2005, the figure did not grow but fluctuated between 
$270,000,000 to 3 billion dollars. Despite the increase in the price of oil 
and contrary to expectations investment in-flows dropped to hit its 
lowest point in the last eight years in the year 2007. The amount of 
foreign investment in the year 2009 was just under $275,000,000. It 
seems that the best records of foreign investment belong to the Economic 
reforms period (2001-2005) which does not come as a surprise 
considering the policies of the administration in power during those 
years.
                                                
37 “One Worthless Zero in Announcing the Amount of Foreign Investment”[in Persian], Tabnak news 
agency, (17 October 2007) http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/204/.  
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The figures discussed above can be more easily compared in the graph 
below which shows the total amount of FDI in-flows between the years 
1995 to 2005. As can be seen in the graph, there is a marked difference 
between different time eras which is a reflection of how important the 
policies of each government could be in attracting foreign investment.
The FDI inflow to Iran from 1995 to 2009
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2-3. the domestic legal framework for foreign investment in Iran:
Graph 3 
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There have been several deliberate attempts to modify the Iranian 
domestic legal climate regarding foreign investment in the last ten years. 
Some of the major improvements in this area have been the amendments 
made to the Iranian Constitution to allow for private ownership of some 
mother industries in 200538, unification of the currency rate in the year 
200239, and legislation of an Act regarding the protection of foreign 
investment in the year 2002. 
The very first Iranian Law concerning and offering protection for foreign 
investments in Iran was an Act entitled “the law on Attraction and 
Promotion of Foreign Investment (in short usually referred to  as LAPFI) 
which was ratified in 1955. After the revolution this law was practically 
no more applied since there was literally no foreign investment to be 
covered by it and the government had no specific policies to attract 
foreign investment for a few years to come. However, once foreign 
investment regained its significance in the Iranian economic policy in the 
second decade after the revolution, there was no option but to apply the 
law despite all its shortcomings, until finally The Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Act (henceforth FIPPA) was legislated in the 
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General Policies of Article 44 of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Expediency (Exigency)
Council May 22, 2005.
39 Ebrahimm Abbasi, “Attraction of Foreign Investment in Iran”[in Persian], Hamshahri daily
newspaper, http://www.topiranian.com/maghalat/archives/009827.html (accessed December 10, 2010)
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Islamic Parliament and the Expediency Council40 and its Implementation 
Regulations were approved in the year 2002.
The enactment of the FIPPA happened as a complement to a whole host 
of macro-economic reforms which had started in Iran since the middle of 
the 1990s. Some key elements of the reforms include: 
1. Unification of foreign exchange rate and considerable liberalization of 
foreign exchange system; 
2. Establishment of numerous private banks and other non-governmental 
private non-banking credit and financial institutions; 
3. Legal reforms for the establishment of private insurance companies; 
4. Removal of a broad range of non-tariff barriers and further 
liberalization of the foreign trade regime; 
5. The inception of a new income tax regime which offers a single and 
competitive flat tax rate of 25%, and a variety of exemptions for 
manufacturing enterprises and total exemption for export-generated 
revenues; 
6. Persistent stress on the transference of state-owned enterprises 
including public sector banks to the private sector.
                                                
40 The exigency council is the conciliatory organ that deals with bills that have been passed by the 
Parliament ,but are not ratified by the Gaurdian Council to become law on the ground that they are 
either contradictory to the Constitution or Islamic Sharia (It acts  based on article 112 of the Iranian 
constitution ).
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2-3-1.FIPPA
The English translation of the Act is added to this study as an appendix
and can be consulted duly. 
As far as the form is concerned, FIPPA is organized in seven chapters 
and includes twenty five articles. 
 Based on this law, foreign investors, who are ‘non-Iranian natural and 
judicial persons or Iranians using capital of a foreign origin’41, need to 
obtain a license to import capital42 to the country, which is an acceptably 
broad definition of foreign investors. Foreign capital could be imported 
to the country through cash funds , converted to Rials or used directly, or 
items in kind43  which could include machinery, intellectual property, 
tools and spares 44  and the like which need to be evaluated upon 
admission by competent authorities.45 The evaluation process is likely to 
vary depending on the type of proposed non-cash investment in 
question. 46  The authority for issuing the investment license is the 
Organization for investment, economic and technical assistance of Iran 
which admits investments for the purpose of development of producing, 
                                                
41 FIPPA, Article 1.
42 Ibid.
43 FIPPA, Article 11.
44 FIPPA, Article 1.
45 FIPPA, Article 11, NOTE.
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A. Avanessian, Torossian, Avanessian & Associates, “foreign investment in Iran”[in Persian], 
www.bicc.org.uk/downloads/Foreign%20Investment%20in%20Iran.pdf.
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mining, agriculture and services in the country47. Such investment is 
admitted if it ‘brings about economic growth, upgrades technology 
enhances quality of products and increases employment opportunities 
and exports’48 and, equally importantly, it should not be detrimental to 
the environment, pose threats to the national security, be damaging to the 
economy or disrupt local production and it should not include the grant 
of a concessions49 to foreigners. There is an important limitation for 
admission of foreign investment in this law, often criticized as one of its 
weaknesses, which is the limited proportion of the value of goods and 
services produced by the foreign investments to the value of goods and 
services supplied to the local market. At the time when the investment 
license is issued, this ratio should not exceed 25% in each economic 
sector and 35% in each sub-sector.50 This can be justified as supportive 
to local industries as a certain market share is attempted to be guaranteed 
for them. Another potentially discouraging factor is that the ownership of 
property by foreign investors is not allowed by this law.51 Investment is 
                                                
47 FIPPA, Article2.
48 FIPPA, Article 2, part A.
49 A concession has been defined as the right which places the foreign investor in a monopolistic 
position. There is a lot of sensitivity as to the word concession within the Iranian law which might 
have historical roots. It should be noted that granting concessions to foreigners is forbidden by the 
Iranian constitution (Art 81).
50 A. Avanessian, Torossian, Avanessian & Associates. “Foreign Investment in Iran”.
51 The law for the ownership of immovable property by foreign nationals ( 1921) is still in force and 
there is nothing in FIPPA to render such ownership permissible.
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admitted under two categories; foreign direct investment is admitted only 
in sectors where private ownership is permitted 52  , whereas foreign 
investment is permissible through ‘Civil partnership’, ‘Buyback’ 
and ’Build-Operate-Transfer’ schemes in all the sectors of the economy. 
Investment by foreign governments depends upon the approval of the 
Islamic parliament on a case by case basis. 53   Article 8 of the Act 
provides for national treatment since foreign investment is granted all 
rights, protections and facilities offered to local investments. This act, in 
comparison with the previous law, has discarded much of the 
complexities and is much more transparent as it has tried to expedite the 
necessary processes to the extent possible. It provides that each relevant 
organization should have a fully authorized agent in the organization for 
foreign investment, technical assistance. This does away with much of 
the burdensome bureaucracy which was previously a major cause of
concern for foreign investors.  
Based on the Act nationalization and expropriation can only take place if 
done on a non-discriminatory basis and for public interest by means of a 
legal process subject to the payment of appropriate compensation on the 
basis of the real value before expropriation. To seek remedy, there is a 
                                                
52 FIPPA, Article 3 part A.
53 FIPPA, Article 4.
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one year time limit to apply for compensation on the grounds of 
expropriation which should be submitted to the Board. 54   Foreign 
investors can transfer profits derived from their investment as well as the 
principal of their foreign capital and the balance of capital remaining in 
the country subject to the fulfilment of all their obligations and payment 
of all dues upon the approval of the board. 55  The foreign exchange 
needed for transfer of money can be secured using the Iranian banking 
system or out of foreign exchange earned from the export of products or 
the ‘foreign exchange earned from service activities of the enterprise in 
which foreign capital is employed’ and also through export of 
permissible goods. One or a combination of these methods can be 
applied, which needs to be specified in the investment license. This 
investment license counts as an export license if the method mentioned is 
through export of goods and services.  The central bank should secure 
and make available foreign currency to the foreign investors upon the 
agreement of the organization and the confirmation of the minister of 
economic affairs and finance.
                                                
54 The foreign investment board is established under article 6 which is the authority for investigation 
of admission applications.
55 FIPPA, Articles 13 and 14.
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 The Act refers all disputes which are not resolved through negotiations 
to the Iranian domestic courts. However, in the case of the existence of a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty between Iran and the country to which the 
foreign investor is a national, the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
BIT will prevail.
 Based on Article 20, all the relevant executive agencies should take 
measures for the issuance of entry visa, permit of work or residence for 
all the foreign investors, managers, experts as well as the private sector 
linked to foreign investment under the act upon the request of the 
organization.
2-3-2 Advantages of FIPPA over its predecessor: 
The enactment of FIPPA has enhanced the investment legal regime of 
the country in several ways when compared to its predecessor, the 
LAPFI. Some of the main advantages are summarized here.
1. There are broader fields for investors to be involved in including the 
country’s infrastructure compared with the previous law. 
2. The definition offered for foreign investment is much broader and 
covers all kinds of investments including  (FDI) as well as various kinds 
of project financing methods such as “Civil Participation”, “Buy-Back” 
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arrangements, “Counter trade”, and different types of “Build-Operate-
Transfer” (BOT) schemes.
3. The Creation of the “Centre for Foreign Investment Services” at the 
(OIETAI) offers focused and highly efficient support for foreign 
investment undertakings in Iran. 
4. Licensing application and approval procedure have been expedited;
5. There are more flexible and much simpler regulatory practices for the 
access of foreign investors to foreign exchange for capital transfer 
purposes envisaged in this law;  
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Chapter three: International treaties
3-1.Bilateral investment treaties
3-1-1.Definition and history:
Bilateral investment treaties are agreements negotiated and concluded 
between two countries according to which the ‘investments made by the 
nationals of the two states parties in each other’s territory will be 
protected’.56 By and large, BITs aim to promote, facilitate and protect 
foreign investment.57
Bilateral investment treaties are a fairly modern phenomenon. However, 
their precursor, ‘treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ took 
off initially in the nineteenth century. They were comparatively much 
more diverse and went beyond commerce even incorporating military 
provisions. However, there was no particular mention of foreign 
investment in the early FCN treaties until they became more investment 
specific58 after the World War II. FCN treaties before the war, largely in 
                                                
56 M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 205.
57Andrew T. Guzman, Alan O. Sykes(eds), Research Handbook in International Economic law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (2007, United Kingdom),214.
58 Ibid, 216.
48
response to the circumstances then, did not offer any protection for 
corporate entities and were only applied to individuals59.
After 1945, FCN treaties continued being concluded at more rapid pace60
but, in many instances, under different names. Occasionally, the United 
States entered treaties called ‘Convention of Establishment’. 
‘Agreements for the Promotion and Protection of Investment’ was how 
the United Kingdom referred to its FCN treaties. When Switzerland was 
a party they were entitled ‘Agreements for the reciprocal promotion and 
protection of investment’. The Soviet’s ‘Treaties of friendship and 
cooperation’ despite their similarity of title to the American treaties were 
of a much less economic character and were chiefly political. 61
The first BIT ever was negotiated between the war-stricken Germany 
and Pakistan in the year 1959. Initial BITs were concluded , to a large 
extent due to the increasing risks of expropriations done in the 1960s 
The preliminary growth rate of these treaties was nothing near 
remarkable, but they caught on before long and started growing 
exponentially especially during the last two decades of the twentieth 
century between countries of all levels of development. As time passed 
                                                
59 ibid.209.
60 ibid.210.
61Ocran, T. Modibo, ”Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: A Comparative Study”,  New York 
Law School Journal of International law & Comp. L. 8,  (1986-1987).
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there were increasingly more intra-developing countries’ treaties as well
as more intra-developed countries’ treaties and they were no more 
exclusively drafted between the developing and the developed world. As 
of the year 2005, there was a network of roughly 2400 treaties in 
existence which grew more than 2800 before 2010.
BITs are different from many other treaties in that there is an inherent 
imbalance of power and an enormous difference between the bargaining 
positions of the two signatories. As a matter of fact, since they have been 
traditionally signed between capital importing and capital exporting 
countries62 with huge technology and wealth disparities, contrary to their 
outer shell most BITs practically encourage only a one-way flow of 
investment, if any thing at all 63 . Developing countries undertake to 
guarantee protection for the capital that they may never even receive and 
this unilateral undertaking is not reciprocated i.e. there are no obligations 
on the part of the capital exporter to guarantee a minimum of investment 
out-flow to the other party. In other words, ‘there is an erosion of 
                                                
62  Jeswald Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries”, International Law24, (1990)655- 656.
‘A BIT purports to create a symmetrical legal relationship between the two states, for it provides that 
either party may invest under the same conditions in the territory of the other. In reality, an asymmetry 
exists between the parties to the BITs since one state will be the source and the other the recipient of 
any investment flows between the two countries’.
63 ibid
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sovereignty by one party without corresponding erosion in the other 
party’.64
Surprisingly, BITs are effectively based on principles that developing 
countries have long historically objected to, such as prompt adequate and 
effective compensation for expropriation or the right of the foreign 
investor to recourse to international arbitration.65 From a perspective, 
they are more of a symbolic gesture on the part of developing countries 
to signify their political and philosophical stance towards foreign 
investment.66
Another important matter of debate among international lawyers as to 
the role of these treaties is whether their unprecedented proliferation in 
recent years can give rise to customary international law or not. While it 
is widely held that their commonness means that they have become part 
of international customary law, it is deemed more realistic to hold that
despite their identical external shell, due to the substantial differences in 
their content they can only constitute a type of lex specialis.
                                                
64 M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 208.
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Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “The Economics of Bilateral Investment. Treaties”, Harvard International 
Law journal 41 ,(2000): 469.
66 Ibid.
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3-1-2.Features of bilateral investment treaties:
There is a basic similarity to the structure of most BITs. Typically and 
like almost all other treaties one would begin with a prefatory statement 
stating the aims and objectives of the treaty which would normally be 
‘protection and encouragement of investment’. However, this will not 
give rise to a positive duty on the part of the capital exporting country to 
encourage a minimum of investment 67 . This is usually followed by 
definitions of the terms used within the treaty and the scope of its 
application. Some of the main features of a typical bilateral investment 
treaty are listed and explicated here.
3-1-3. Scope of application and definitions: 
The scope of the treaty is usually delimited through the definitions 
offered in the treaty. As a general rule of thumb, there is a pronounced 
tendency in existing BITs to define investment as broadly as possible 
including tangible, intangible and intellectual property as well as 
company equities 68   to maximize protection. Investment is usually 
defined to comprise foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. 
However, many BITs limit their protection only to investments made in 
                                                
67 ibid.
68 Andrew T. Guzman, Alan O. Sykes(eds), Research Handbook in International Economic Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited(2007, United Kingdom)
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complete accordance with local laws and sometimes certain admission 
procedures are required to be followed. As a matter of fact, the host state 
is usually allowed to prevent foreign investment from being established 
in the first place or admit it conditionally, yet after the foreign 
investment has been admitted the host state faces major constraints to 
regulate it 69. Some treaties do not include tax provisions and therefore it 
is possible for the host state to tax the foreign company more heavily 
which is of course in violation of non-discriminatory behaviour in the 
vast majority of the treaties unless it has been reserved as an exception.70
In other words, some treaties carve out taxation from the application of 
the treaty standards. This is because Bits are applicable to all regulatory 
measures unless otherwise stated.71 There is also mixed practice as to 
whether the protection could be extended to investments made prior to 
the treaty or not. Another key part of the treaty has to do with the criteria 
based on which nationality has been defined. Nationality is just as 
important for natural persons as corporate bodies and its definition could 
affect the scope of application. However BITs tend to cover a wide 
                                                
69 Kenneth J. Vandevelde.
70 ibid
71. William W. Park, “ NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA's. Tax Veto”, Chicago. 
Journal of International Law2, (2001).
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breadth of legal entities as far as their type is concerned.72 Recent BITs 
have tried to address the complexities which have arisen because of the 
rise of multi national companies by combining different traditional tests 
of nationality.
3-1-4. Standard of treatment:  For two hundred years there had been 
sharp difference of opinion on whether aliens were entitled to a 
minimum treatment or not. Standards used before the widespread 
proliferation of BITs included a very wide spectrum ranging from the 
Calvo’s famous doctrine of ‘reverse national treatment’ often advocated 
by developing countries to the Hull rule73 put forth by Cordell Hull, the 
then US secretary of state, after the nationalization of many US citizens’ 
properties following the Mexican Nationalization of 1932. BITs are now 
a hefty network of treaties that appear to have miraculously resolved this 
longstanding seemingly irresolvable conflict 74 . However, realistically 
talking, one would come to the conclusion that in this respect developed 
countries appear to have gotten their way. Here some of the traditionally 
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Andrew T. Guzman, Alan O. Sykes(eds), Research Handbook in International Economic Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited(2007, United Kingdom)
73 ‘Hull rule… requires full compensation, in the event of expropriation of the property of the foreign 
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foreign investments to international law’ see  Babatunde Lot Ogungbamila , “BITs Are they shields or 
swords in the hands of foreign investors”, CEMLP Annual Review (CAR), 2007/2008. 
74 Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, “The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Suffolk 
Trans national  Law Review32, (2008-2009): 265.
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common standards of treatment including those usually applied in 
modern BITs are presented.
National treatment: Based on this standard the nationals to the treaty 
party should not be accorded a treatment less favourable than that 
accorded to the nationals of the host country. This, however, has not 
been very appealing to foreign investors since there have been 
established historical precedents of gross misuse from this standard.75 A 
common feature of FCN treaties especially when combined with most-
favoured nation treatment, it has now given its place to higher and more 
investment friendly treatments in BITs. Unlike the past that this standard 
was constantly rejected by capital-exporting countries, today many 
countries reserve several economic privileges for their nationals. 
Therefore, this standard can become tantamount to non-discrimination 
and has therefore gained relevance for developed countries76. Countries 
that impose performance requirements would normally exempt 
performance or entry requirements from this standard of treatment. 
Fair and equitable treatment: 
Unlike national treatment it is an absolute standard in the sense that it 
should be accorded to aliens regardless of the treatment the citizens of a 
                                                
75 Examples can be incidents which ensued the Mexican nationalization and the Russian revolution.
76 Sornaraja, M., The international law on foreign investment,215. 
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country receive. However, it is vague and its vagueness has, so far, 
prompted tension and conflict 77 . This standard found its way into
investment law literature from the Havana charter in 1948.78 Based on its 
article11 (2) foreign investment had to be assured ‘just and equitable 
treatment’. It was through this channel that this standard started being 
adopted in many FCN treaties as well as the Energy Charter treaty and 
NAFTA. 79  In some BITs this standard has been prescribed with no 
strings attached while in many it has been mixed with other standards or 
in reference to international law80. ‘the international standard is nothing 
else but a set of rules, correlated to each other and deriving from one 
particular norm of general international law, namely that the treatment of 
an alien is regulated by the law of nations’ Undeniably, there is a big 
deal of overlap between this standard and Fair and equitable treatment81
and drawing a clear line between the two has been a tough task for 
international tribunals. However, according to a NAFTA commission 
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interpretative note, the fair and equitable standard is noting additional to 
the international minimum standard of customary international law.82  
Most-favoured nation treatment: 
Having its roots in FCN treaties, MFN has become an important and 
defining part of all BITs. This, given the abundance of these treaties, 
translates to the accordance of the highest standard ever accorded in any 
BIT to all investors regardless of what country they come from which 
might sometimes bring about unwanted results. There has already been a 
precedent for MFN regarding dispute settlement mechanism; it was held 
that a foreign investor protected by a bilateral treaty could use the more 
appealing terms of another treaty. 83  However, states belonging to 
regional organizations or multilateral treaties containing more favourable 
terms would normally seek to exclude them from the purview of their 
BITs to prevent their unwanted extension through MFN provisions.  
3-1-5.Admission and Performance requirements:
Under customary international law, countries are allowed to admit 
foreign investment as well as aliens or not. In most treaties the same 
approach is adopted and rarely have any treaties conferred an absolute 
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right to admit all foreign investments.84 In most other treaties, admission 
of foreign capital has been made subject to the laws and regulations of 
the host country.
In addition to this, in order to maximize the benefits of investment, host 
states try to impose some obligations on the foreign investor including 
the obligation to export part of the production, buy local goods and use 
local labour. The obligation to export part of the product is an attempt to 
protect local entrepreneurs who may not have the financial strength to 
compete with big multinational companies having a much lower cost of 
production. Using local goods and labour could also each in a way
benefit the economy of the host state. However, developed countries are 
not exactly appealed by the idea and there have been attempts to prohibit 
them. The Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)85 is to an extent 
based on the prohibition of performance requirements. Some countries 
such as the United States and Canada have completely excluded them 
from their BITs.86 Despite their apparent merits for the host country, they 
seem to be against the national treatment and non-discrimination 
requirements entrenched in most treaties; it is possible, however, to 
                                                
84 Liberalization of investment treaties has been undertaken by US and Canada. See, for example, the 
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85Sornaraja, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment,238.
86Sornaraja, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment,238.
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exempt performance requirements from non-discrimination requirements 
of BITs. 
3-1-6.Repatriation of profits: 
One of the main objectives of investments treaties is the protection of the 
right of the investor to repatriate its profits87. Logically without being 
able to do so, there would be no incentive for investors to make foreign 
investments. However, not all the treaties grant an absolute right of 
repatriation to foreign investors; difficulties usually arise at times of 
economic crisis and an absolute right of repatriation in such situations is 
very cumbersome. In many UK treaties, as an example, there is an 
undertaking to repatriate a maximum of 20 percent of the profit in 
difficult economic conditions.
3-1-7.Dispute resolution mechanism:
Most states are not normally akin to the idea of international arbitration 
for their state contracts, including investment agreements, with foreign 
individuals. However, a foreign investor could use the bilateral 
investment treaty between its country and the host state, or another BIT 
with a third country by virtue of the MFN treatment, to seek remedy in 
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international arbitration.  Almost all BITs have provisions regarding 
international arbitration. Two different dispute resolution mechanisms 
are normally stated in BITs. One concerning the possible disputes 
between the foreign investor and the host state which are typically 
provided to be resolved under an international arbitration institution such 
as the ICSID or ICC or, otherwise, on an ad hoc basis.  This, by itself, 
can prevent disputes between investors and host states from respectively 
becoming a dispute between the two states.88 The second type involves 
disputes between the two host states which are also normally resolved
through arbitration with the difference that in case of a failure to choose 
the arbitrator on the part of one country, more often than not, the head of 
the International Court of Justice is put in charge of choosing the 
arbitrator. This has been one of the major legal developments brought 
about by the emergence of investment treaties; many developing 
countries had long rejected the jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals over 
investment contracts. It should be noted, however, that because of the 
                                                
88
I. Shihata, “Towards a Depoliticisation of Foreign Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID
and MIGA”,  ICSID Review 1 (1986):1.
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diverse nature of dispute settlement provisions of different BITs no 
uniform patterns have emerged.89
3-1-8. Bilateral Investment Treaties of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Despite their global widespread commonness especially during the 
1980s and 1990s, bilateral investment treaties are a rather new concept to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, Iran had entered into a number of 
FCN treaties including one with the USA in 1958, which formed the 
basis of jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Hostages90, and Oil Platform91
cases.
The reason why there was a disinclination to sign investment treaties 
with other countries might have been that there had not been any 
investment specific domestic regulatory framework in the country since 
the 1979 revolution which ensued massive nationalization of all 
industries by the government and the prohibition of foreign investment 
by the Iranian constitution. The very first BIT Iran concluded was with 
Armenia in the year 1995. Interestingly, the first instances of these 
treaties were all negotiated with economically mediocre neighbouring 
                                                
89
Antonio Parra and Ibrahim Shihata, “Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in 
Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Treaties on Investment”, 
ICSID Review 12, (1997): 287.
90 Hostages case. 119 ICJ Rep., 1979,
91 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) 2003.
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countries which had never been particularly capital exporting at least to 
Iran. In fact, Iran did not conclude any treaties with developed countries 
for the first some years until 1998 when the Iran-Switzerland bilateral 
investment treaty was concluded. Despite the fact that the country began 
considering foreign investment as a supply for its development program 
after the war during the reconstruction period, it was not until the early 
years of the first decade of the 20th century that such instruments became 
a key part of the country’s economic policy largely as a result of the 
sweeping economic reforms that had commenced during the presidency 
of Mohammad Khatami as well as the international mood in favour of 
such treaties. There are forty six treaties in force at present. However, it 
is essential to note that only a very small fraction of these treaties have 
been concluded with truly capital exporting countries such as the OECD 
countries and others seem to be only political gestures and a step towards 
reinforcing political ties. 
Like any other international treaty the Islamic Republic concludes, 
Iranian BITs need to be ratified by the Iranian Islamic parliament92 as 
well as the Guardian council93. Once ratified, they become part of the 
                                                
92 . Iranian Constitution, article 77.
93 The guardian council is the authority to decide whether parliamentary legislations are in complete 
conformity with Islamic principles and The Iranian constitution.
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domestic law and gain legal status and, in turn, concluding such treaties 
contribute to the creation of a safer legal framework conducive towards 
attracting foreign investment. A good reflection of the bargaining 
position and negotiating powers of the two parties in bilateral treaties, 
Iranian BITs are not uniform but share basic similar principles. Here, 
different provisions of BITs signed by Iran will be studied more closely 
with due references made. The English version of the BIT which was 
signed with South Africa has been appended to this study.  Iranian BITs 
typically include 14 or 15 articles and follow a common pattern. 
However, many of the treaties have additional protocols suited to the 
agreement between the particular contracting parties.
(Total BITs concluded between Iran and other countries)
No Country Time of conclusion Date of entry inoto force
1 Armenia May1995 26 February 1997
2 Belarus Jul1995 23 June 2000
3 Tajikistan Jul1995 3 November 2004
4 Georgia Sep1995 22 June 2005
5 Pakistan Nov1995 27 June 1998
6 Kazakhstan Jan1996 3 April 1999
7 Turkmenistan Jan1996 29Apr2004
8 Yemen Feb1996 16 October 2004
9 Ukraine May1996 5 July 2003
10 Kyrgyzstan Jul1996 27 June 2005
11 Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Jul1996 25 August 2002
12 Azerbaijan Oct1996 20 June 2002
13 Turkey Dec1996 13 April 2005
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14 South Africa Nov1997 5 March 2002
15 Lebanon Oct1997 14 May 2000
16 Syria Feb1998 16 November2005
17 Switzerland March1998 1 November 2001
18 Poland Oct1998 26 October 2001
19 South Korea Oct1998 31 March 2006
20 Bulgaria Nov1998 24 August 2003
21 Italy Mar1999 27 July 2005
22 Qatar May1999 5 November 2001
23 Sudan Sep1999 19 October 2001
24 Croatia May2000 2 August 2003
25 Uzbekistan Jun2000 11 July 2004
26 Macedonia Jul2000 19 August 2005
27 China, People’s
Republic
Jul2000 1 July 2005
28 Morocco Jan2001 31 March 2003
29 Austria Feb2001 11 July 2004
30 Tunisia Apr2001 27 February 2003
31 Bangladesh Apr2001 5 December 2002
32 Oman Dec2001 8 April 2003
33 Romania Jan2002 12 January 2005
34 Malaysia Jul2002 4 August 2006
35 Germany Aug2002 23 June 2005
36 North Korea Sep2002 24 April 2005
37 Bahrain Oct2002 12 October 2004
38 Spain Oct2002 27 April 2004
39 Finland Nov2002 25 June 2004
40 France May2003 12 November 2004
41 Algeria Oct2003 5 December 2005
42 Serbia &
Montenegro
Dec2003 7 July 2006
43 Venezuela Mar2005 7 June 2006
44 Sweden Sep2005 2 March 2008
45 Afghanistan May2006 2 February 2008
The preamble and definitions:
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The preambles of most treaties are almost identical except for minor 
differences in the wordings. The benefits of foreign investment as well 
as the countries’ aim to strengthen their economic ties are usually 
stressed in the preamble.94 The word investment is defined rather broadly
in most Iranian BITs to include all the assets and property invested by 
one country according to the rules and regulations of the host country. 
These assets could be in the form of movable and immovable property, 
money and receivables as well as intangible property including 
intellectual property, company shares and patent rights and the right to 
search for and explore natural resources. The investor could be natural or 
juridical persons with the nationality of the contracting parties.
Standard of treatment and compensation of losses: Despite the bare 
minimum being similar, Iran seems to have taken a flexible stance. 
Standard of treatment and nationalization provisions of the treaties with 
developing countries are not elaborate and tend to be fairly brief, while 
in treaties with developed countries such as Sweden, there are more 
                                                
94 As an example in the Iran- South Africa BIT  it is mentioned: “Desiring to intensify the economic 
cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States;
Intending to utilize their economic resources and potential facilities in the area of
investments as well as to create and maintain favourable conditions for investments of the investors of 
the Contracting Parties in each others’ territory and;
Recognizing the need to promote and protect investments of the investors of the
Contracting Parties in each others’ territory;
Have Agreed as follows:” Most other treaties have very similar prefatory statements and there are no 
explicit differences between the first Iranian BIT with Armenia and very recent ones.
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detailed terms and discussions. Based on all the treaties one party shall 
not nationalize, expropriate or confiscate the investment of foreign 
investors unless these measures are taken with due process of law in a 
non discriminatory manner and upon prompt, effective and immediate 
payment of compensation which amounts to the full value of the 
investment right before nationalization. In the Iran- Sweden BIT, there 
are more elaborate provisions as to the compensation paid. In particular, 
the compensation should be made public immediately after imminent 
nationalization or actual nationalization; the amount of compensation 
should be decided by the host state courts and should be paid in a freely 
transferable currency. If the payment of compensation shall be subject to 
delay compensation should include losses incurred because of delay as 
well. While in most treaties, as to the losses inflicted as a result of armed 
conflicts, riots and revolutions, the treatment offered should not be less 
favourable than the one accorded to any third party, in some treaties95
with developed countries, certain exceptions have been numerated. For 
example, if such losses are caused by confiscation or destruction of
property by the military of the host country, full compensation should be 
paid.
                                                
95 Examples are BITs with Sweden and Finland and South Africa.
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Entry and performance requirements: According to the
overwhelming majority of BITs signed between Iran and other countries, 
contracting parties should accept all foreign investment coming from the 
contracting party. However, admission of investments is subject to the 
laws and regulations of each contracting party. Each contracting party is 
legally obliged to issue all the necessary licenses once the investment is 
successfully admitted. There are examples of treaties which take a more 
conservative position and do not admit an explicit undertaking to admit 
foreign investment at all96 or mention that investment will be admitted 
once a number of condition are met97. However, since the majority of 
Iranian treaties do not contain such terms, it seems that these additional 
requirements should have been part of the BIT model of the other party. 
As to the entry requirements in the case of Iran, as discussed earlier, the 
FIPPA determines the limitations of investment and it is possible based 
on this law to decide whether a certain investment plan qualifies as
legible or not based on a set of criteria. In some treaties the Organization 
for foreign investment, economic and technical assistance is introduced 
as the authority whose consent is essential for admission of foreign 
                                                
96 .Examples are: BITs with Armenia, Republic of Macedonia, Yemen, Kuwait. 
97 Examples are: BITs with Sweden, Indonasia.
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investment 98 . However, even if this is not mentioned, the Iranian 
domestic laws, namely the FIPPA, provide for the investment license to 
be issued by the mentioned organization.99
Dispute settlement mechanism: As is the norm with all bilateral 
investment treaties, all disputes including those between the contracting 
parties and those between the host state and foreign investors are referred 
to arbitration. As far as disputes between the contracting parties are 
concerned, there is a more or less similar stance; the countries try to 
resolve the dispute amicably. In case of disagreement, the case will be 
decided by a panel of two arbitrators chosen by the two states and an 
umpire chosen by the arbitrators. If either of the contracting parties fails 
to choose an arbitrator or the arbitrators cannot agree upon an umpire, 
either party can request the head of the International Court of Justice to 
make the choice.
  However, should there be a dispute between the investor and the host 
country, the position adopted in treaties between developing and 
developed countries is quite dissimilar; in treaties with developing 
countries, arbitration is provided as a choice over national courts, 
whereas in many other treaties especially those with developed countries 
                                                
98 An example is the BIT between Iran and Zimbabwe, Bahrain.
99 Article 5, FIPPA. 
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arbitration is the only option if negotiations and other alternative dispute 
mechanisms fail to resolve the conflict. In addition to this, developing 
countries seem to have an inclination towards the UNCITRAL 
arbitration codes. On the other hand, developed countries tend to prefer 
arbitration done under the auspices of institutions such as the ICC and 
ICSID.
Final provisions: In this part, as is the norm with most international 
treaties, entry into force terms, duration and authentic languages of the 
treaty are determined. Treaties involving Iran usually provide for Persian, 
English and the language of the contracting party as authentic languages; 
should any dispute arise as to the interpretation of the treaty, the English 
version would normally prevail. Many of the treaties remain valid for a 
period of 10 or 15 years. However, after the lapse of this period it will 
remain in force unless one of the contracting parties notifies the other of 
its unwillingness to continue with it with a six months prior notice.
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3-1-9. Effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties:
In recent years BITS have become the main ‘International legal 
mechanism for the encouragement and governance’ of FDI.100   
It can be argued that the standard of treatment provisions, mainly fair 
and equitable treatment, in a network of more than 2800 treaties has 
become part of international customary law and as part of international 
customary law it shall be binding upon all countries even those who have 
not signed any. This has emerged as a significant pleasing change in an 
area of international law which had been among the least definite and the 
most argued. Another important feature particularly benefiting nationals 
of capital-exporting countries is the dispute settlement provisions of 
most BITs. There is no doubt that the developed world have benefited 
hugely from the advent and massive proliferation of these treaties since, 
as capital exporters, their residents who aim to invest abroad have a 
much larger security margin and many previously disputed principles 
such as the right to access fair and impartial arbitration have become 
quite established thanks to investment treaties. The question which has 
been addressed numerous times, but remains to be answered definitively 
                                                
100 . Elkins, Z., Guzman, A., & Simmons, B. (2004). “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Working paper. University of Illinois, University of California at 
Berkeley and Harvard University. 1960–2000.
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is about the benefits they can potentially bring about as far as the 
developing countries seeking economic growth are concerned. In other 
words, do they fulfil their much sought after goal of increasing FDI flow 
to developing countries? 
Some studies find no link between the two and consider the economic 
and political climate far more important than the legal structure.101 There 
are many examples of countries with large FDI inflows without having 
developed a large network of BITs. 102  Empirical studies are much 
divided on the effects of BITs on the increase of FDI inflows for 
developing countries. (Eric Niumayer and Laura Spess 2005) finds a 
‘positive effect of BITs on FDI inflows that is consistent and robust 
across various model specifications’. While there are other studies 
(Hallward-Driemeier 2003) that suggest there is no significant 
correlation and others implying (Tobin& Rose-Ackerman 2005) a 
positive effect exists only for low-risk countries which are in fact those 
which need bilateral investment treaties the least. The increase in the 
number of BITs concluded can, by itself, be proof of their acceptance 
                                                
101
M. Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Journal of World Trade 
Law, 20,(1986) 79–98.
102
UNCTAD (1998). Bilateral investment treaties in the mid-1990s. New York and Geneva: United 
Nations.
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among developing countries as an effective way of attracting foreign 
investment inflows. 
Iran has also experienced a major, however, insufficient growth since 
she started concluding BITs. This increase can not easily be ascribed to 
its bilateral investment treaties alone. Most importantly because, as will 
be discussed in more depth in next chapter, before the year 1993 foreign 
investment had no place in neither the Iranian government’s economic 
equations nor its legal structure. As well as this, the amount of 
investment Iran attracts is arguably far less than a country of its size and 
resources while the number of its BITs is quite typical. Therefore, it 
should be concluded that there are other factors preventing Iran from 
maximizing its foreign investment. The nature of these factors will be 
further clarified in next chapters of this study.
3-2.Double tax treaties
3-2-1.The issue of double taxation
Originally, taxation was an essentially domestic concept free from all 
international complexities, as taxes were imposed on immovable 
property by a sovereign power in whose jurisdiction the land was placed. 
However, the basis for taxation has undergone a transformation and has 
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been shifted to individuals, which may give rise to issues such as tax 
evasion and double taxation.103 Double taxation arises when the same 
income is being taxed twice, which could normally happen if a tax 
paying-entity resident of a country does business in another country, 
usually referred to as the source country; since each country has its own 
sovereign right to tax income and its own set of tax rules, the taxpaying 
entity might be subject to taxes on the same income twice. 
Taxation and fiscal transparency are important considerations for 
investors when drawing up an investment plan and opting for a 
destination. Clearly, ‘Double taxation invariably increases the burden of 
tax on foreign income. This has a negative impact on cross-border 
movements of investment, technology and expertise.’104 Some developed 
countries provide for relief against double taxation in their domestic 
income tax laws. Besides, to avoid this problem and to encourage 
international investment flows, countries have signed a quite big network 
of double taxation agreements (DTA).
                                                
103 Oscar, M. Trelles I., “Double taxation/Fiscal Evasion and International Tax Treaties”, Indiana Law 
review 12, no 2(1979): 341.
104 “Agreements on the avoidance of Double taxation:  Understanding our DTAs”  
http://www.iras.gov.sg/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_867D105BE54EAB1A9ECF94767EB3CF588DFB0
000/filename/dtawriteupforwebsiteamended.pdf. 
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3-2-2. the definition and a history of double taxation agreements
Double taxation agreements are usually bilateral treaties concluded 
between countries to avoid tax-related problems such as double taxation 
and, in some cases, tax evasion and to ultimately facilitate the flow of 
international investment. What a double taxation treaty does is provide 
clarity and certainty as to how and when taxes are imposed. These
agreements endeavour to offer protection to investors against double 
taxation. As well as that, they aim to prevent discrimination between 
taxpayers on a global basis and try to provide an acceptable level of 
fiscal and legal certainty as far as taxes are concerned. 
In fact, in a DTA, the taxing rights of each country are usually defined 
and often one or both countries are required to offer tax exemption or 
credit to obviate the problem of double taxation. In general, there are 
conceivably three possible methods for the allocation of tax incomes 
between the two countries: 
“1. Full rights to tax only in one country, i.e., the other country exempts
the income. The full rights may be allocated either to the country of 
source or residence.
2. Full rights to tax by both countries but with tax in the source country 
limited to no more than a specified level and the country of residence 
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giving a credit for tax paid in the source country. This form of allocation 
normally results in a sharing of tax between the two countries; 
3. Full rights to tax by both countries without limitation and the country 
of residence giving a credit for tax paid in the source country.”105
Although tax relief treaties can be traced to as early as the late nineteenth 
century106; they were mostly concluded between developed countries in 
the first half of the twentieth century. DTAs only emerged in the 1960s 
as an important feature of international fiscal policy of countries and did 
not gain any significant popularity until 1965, mainly because they did 
not appeal to developing countries. However, they grew commoner as 
time passed; the proliferation of DTTs resembles the spread and 
diffusion of BITs around the world (Fitzgerald 2002). Many such 
agreements provided that the source country forgo tax revenues by 
offering an exemption and as developing countries had little or no capital 
outflows, this mechanism worked against their interests and was 
conceived as unfair. This triggered international efforts to rectify their 
                                                
105. “Agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: Understanding our DTAs”
106 As an example there were actual tax agreements in force between Austria and Hungary in the late 
nineteenth century as well as agreements between Austria-Greece and Switzerland-Italy respectively 
in 1902 and 1904.
See more: Adrian A. Kragen, “Double Income Taxation Treaties:The O.E.C.D. Draft”,  California 
Law Review52 (1964) :306.
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format and make them more favourable to tax-importing developing 
countries mainly in the 1960s.  
Model treaties have been drafted internationally so as to facilitate and 
expedite conclusion of these treaties. There are two main models for tax 
treaties namely, the OECD model and the United Nations model treaty. 
It was acknowledged by the Fiscal Committee of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development in 1965 that the treaties which 
had been in use until then did not take the circumstances of developing 
countries into account and were, therefore, of little interest to developing 
countries. The OECD model treaty was drafted in this context and aimed 
to tackle this problem.  However, quite ironically, having been drafted 
by an organization composed of developed countries, the OECD model
is alleged to favour resident based taxation which would be more 
beneficial to capital exporting countries, mainly developed countries. In 
fact, the UN model followed as an initiative taken by developing 
countries to balance the allegedly biased OECD model. 
There are a number of OECD model treaties with the first drafted in
1968. However, The OECD model treaty which underwent major 
revision in 1997 is composed of 27 articles organized in seven chapters. 
The UN model, which was first drafted in 1980 and later revised  in 1999,  
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includes 29 articles .There is striking similarity between the structures of 
the two model treaties as if the UN model has used the OECD pattern; it 
has been argued that the UN version is still biased against developing 
countries (Figueroa 1992). More importantly, it should be admitted that, 
still an overwhelming majority of DTTs use the OECD model (Arnold, 
Sasseville and Zolt 2002).
As to the DTTs concluded by Iran, the UN model has been adopted. The 
conclusion of these treaties was expedited in Iran throughout the 
economic reform period after 1996. As of March 2009, Iran had signed a 
total of 34 treaties. However, similar to what was stated about BITs, 
most treaty partners of Iran happen to be developing countries with 
insignificant capital exports. 
The Iranian tax treaties become part of the domestic tax regime after 
parliamentary ratification like all other international treaties and are 
given the status of law.107
                                                
107 Based on the Iranian Civil Law code, article 9, all treaties are given legal status upon ratification in 
the Islamic Parliament and the Guardian Council.
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3-2-3. Effectiveness
Developing countries allocate resources to negotiating these treaties. As 
well as this, since most agreements typically favour residence based 
taxation rather than source based taxation, they will inevitably lose tax 
revenues108. This loss can only be justified if there is an actual increase 
in the FDI they have attracted as a result of these treaties.
Clearly, double taxation does not represent the most important reason 
barring foreign investment in a developing country 109  and the 
impediments go far beyond taxation, but avoidance of double taxation 
could be conducive to the creation of an investment friendly climate in 
any given country. 
Like BITs, DTTs could be a friendly inviting gesture bringing about 
“international economic recognition” as a safe investment setting and 
goes much beyond the mere issue of taxation (Dagan 1999).
There are a number of studies that have tried to investigate the possible 
links between investment inflows and the conclusion of DTAs. Some 
other studies generally group them with BITs and study the effectiveness 
                                                
108
Eric, Neumayer  “Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries?” Journal of Development Studies 43 ,8 (2007): 150.
109 ibid.
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of international treaties in general110  on investment. (Simmons 2006) 
finds a very strong positive correlation between the FDI flow and 
national tax system attributes. In fact, the tax regime of a country is an 
important factor involved in the amount of investment a country can 
attract. Simons has taken the ‘availability and extent of relief for double 
taxation’ into account as one of the attributes of corporate taxing systems 
in his study. Considering this matter and given that DTAs serve to 
modify the tax regime of countries, even though insignificantly, it 
appears logical to extend his findings to DTAS. Eric Neumayer( 2007) 
finds that signing a DTT with the USA or a higher number of DTTs will 
promote Foreign investment inflows. However, this is found to apply 
only to middle-class developing countries and not low-class developing 
countries.
It seems that the link between concluding tax treaties and attraction of 
foreign investment is more than tenuous. This, however, does not justify 
the huge costs developing countries have to bear to enter such treaties, or 
at least all of them; countries should be more calculating when choosing 
                                                
110 K.P. Sauvant, L.E. Sachs (Eds.) “The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows”, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford/New York (2009).
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treaty partners. In particular, a higher number of treaties with wealthy 
eveloped countries should be more desirable. 
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Chapter four: Impediments to foreign 
investment
As it was discussed in previous chapters, the Iranian government has 
become much more aware of the benefits of foreign investment on its 
economy in the last twenty years; Iran has tried to modify its economic 
and legal climate so as to make it more favourable to foreign investors 
primarily through legislation of an investment law. As well as this, it has 
concluded a relatively big number of international treaties as a friendly 
inviting gesture to foreign investors. Despite all its efforts, admittedly, 
Iran has not been successful in absorbing sufficient foreign capital 
especially considering its needs and compared to international standards 
for a country of its size, population and resources; the total amount of 
FDI approved by the government between the years 1993 to 2008 was 
approximately 34 billion dollars of which only about 10 per cent has 
actually entered the country. This considering the 100 billion dollar need 
for foreign investment, often cited by Iranian authorities, is less than 
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satisfactory.111 It appears that there must exist further barriers which 
have not yet been duly addressed. As it can be seen in the chart below,
Iran has not attracted much foreign investment compared to its 
neighbours while most of them do not have any competitive advantage 
over it. In fact, among the countries listed, Iran has the largest natural 
resources, is the largest of all and has a huge market size compared to 
others. Considering all these privileges, it takes a country terribly poor 
investment attraction policies to be this unsuccessful in attracting foreign 
investment. 
                                                
111 Ali Mjedi, “Impediments to Foreign Investment”[in Persian] ,Iran Economist website,  
http://www.iraneconomist.com/economic/economic-articles/2901-2009-04-20-06-22-24.html.
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It can be seen in the chart that Turkey, UAE and Qatar have had the best 
records regionally. Putting Turkey aside, having admitted less foreign 
investment than Qatar and UAE, which are very insignificant in size and 
do not have any real economic advantages over Iran, speaks for itself. If 
this fact is put in the context of the Iranian mammoth oil reserves, the 
need for further studies into the causes of the possible reasons for the 
failure of the government to attract FDI seem very obvious.
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The Islamic Parliament research centre mentions three main 
impediments to foreign investment in Iran. 1. Cultural reasons; 2. The 
non-competitive and non-liberal nature of the Iranian economy 
compounded by an abundance of non-transparent laws; 3. High 
economic risks in Iran.112  
(Affifi 2005), however, believes that the main barriers to investment in 
Iran are less economic in nature and are mainly political and legal 
including primarily the ever increasing tensions between Iran and the 
west, United states and Israel especially, recently, as a result of the 
Iranian nuclear program, a xenophobic attitude towards foreigners in 
Iran, a lack of legal transparency, difficult legal procedures and 
bureaucracy113. In this study, impediments to foreign investment in Iran 
have been listed and discussed under four very broad categories, namely 
cultural impediments, political impediments, economic impediments and 
legal impediments.
4-1.Cultural and religious impediments: The first instances of foreign 
investment in Iran, namely the Reuters and Darcy concessions, however 
                                                
112“The Most Important Impediments to Foreign Investment were Investigated”[in Persian] , No 6011, 
Resalat Newspaper, Page 16 Economic Page, 15 November 2006.
Based on the same report, the rate of investment risk in Iran is 59 percent which compares 
unfavourably to Singapore 11, Japan  12, UAE 28, China 37 and the USA 23.
113 . Frajollah , Afifi, “Impediments to Foreign Direct Investment in Iran”[in Persian], unpublished 
LLM thesis, Shahid Beheshti University of Tehran, 2005.
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typical of their period, have been cited repeatedly as examples of foreign 
exploitation of the Iranian national resources. This has had an important 
influence on the creation of a deep xenophobia among the Iranians at 
least as far as foreign investment in natural resources is concerned114. In 
the wake of the 1979 revolution many industries and huge businesses 
were nationalized. Many of these nationalizations were done without any 
compensation paid especially in the case of Iranian nationals who could 
seek no remedies. This was done mainly as the newly founded Islamic 
regime had a tendency to distance itself from western capitalism and 
intended to steer away from anything associated with the Shah regime. 
There was generally a pessimistic mindset as to the legitimacy of private 
ownership and there was little respect for Iranian entrepreneurs who 
were suspected of having become wealthy through receiving rents from 
the previous regime. One of the main pillars of criticism levelled at the
Shah Regime was that his policies had caused economic and political 
dependence on the west. The revolution revived nationalistic sentiments 
and given the media propaganda, opposition to foreign capital became 
part of the Iranian political culture. The government should try to shift 
public opinion since a prerequisite for attracting investment is a 
                                                
114 Resalat newspaper, no 6011, page 16, 24/8/85.
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widespread belief in its efficiency and usefulness.115 Religion has also 
had its role to play; based on Shia Islam teachings, a Muslim nation 
should not be dependent in any respect on a non-Muslim country. This 
principle also manifested itself in The Iranian constitution.116 In fact, it 
was mainly on this ground that Iranian politicians had little inclination to 
use foreign investment in the first decade after the revolution. 
4-2. Political impediments:
Main political barriers to foreign investment in Iran include tensions 
with the west, economic sanctions and a lack of domestic political 
stability.
4-2-1.Iran west relationships: Maintaining a good relationship with the 
developed world is an incredibly important criterion especially in today’s 
world when investors are more inclined to make investments in 
developing countries rather than developed countries so as to make 
bigger profits. Understanding this trend, developing countries compete 
with one another for creating more favourable circumstances for 
prospective investors. This competition is not entirely of an economic 
                                                
115
Mousa Ghani Nejad, Mahdi Navab, “The Challenges of Foreign Investment in Iran”[in Persian] , 
2001,  http://www.csr.ir/Center.aspx?lng=fa&abtid=06&&nxtid=14.
116 This is based on a famous Shia principle “La Sabil” literally “no way” which dictates there should 
be no way for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslim countries. This was one of the principles 
based on which foreign investment was severely opposed to.
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nature and politics should by no means be overlooked. In other words, 
developing countries which have less tension with developed countries 
usually have the upper hand and are more likely to be the final 
destination for foreign capital.
 Since the revolution of 1979, there has always been much tension 
between Iran and the west as a whole. The history of this uneasy 
relationship can be traced initially in the hostage crisis in 1979. However, 
this already soured relationship worsened as the war started since many 
western powers overtly or discreetly sided with Iraq. Iran, not long 
before a strategic alley of the US, was suddenly an ideologically founded 
regime which was considered a threat to the interests of the US in the 
region. The US has used its influence to turn other states against Iran as 
well. As the strongest economic power in the world, the USA has used 
political as well as economic leverage to isolate Iran. The US has always 
accused Iran of having a part in the hostilities in the region and of 
interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. Iran has 
always reciprocated by presenting counter allegations of the same nature. 
Some recent global developments have served to deteriorate the 
conditions and have obviously widened the gap between Iran and the 
west. First, there has been a general distrust of Muslims in the wake of 
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the 2001 New York terrorist attacks which is even aggravating as 
extremist Muslim groups continue to threaten the security of the world. 
The US initiated a war against two of the Iranian neighbours which has 
understandably placed Iran in a more defensive position. In addition, the 
seemingly irresolvable Iranian nuclear case has had its important part to 
play in deepening the gap between Iran and the west; there have been 
huge economic and political pressure, in the form of Security Council 
and unilateral sanctions, put on Iran to make it abandon its allegedly 
ambitious nuclear program. However, it appears that the west has 
achieved little and Iran is still pursuing its program very rigorously. Last 
but not least, the election of President Ahmadi Nerjad in the 2005 
opened a new chapter in the history of Iran-west relationships and in a 
way undid all the efforts made by previous Iranian governments to 
bridge the gap. The Iranian so-called radical president has, on several 
occasions, touched on a number of contentious and sensitive issues such 
as the Holocaust, the existence of the Israeli nation and very recently117
the possible link between the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September 
and the US government which has caused acrimony and has intensified 
the animosity between Iran and the West. Needless to mention, the 
                                                
117 New York general assembly of the United Nations (September 2010) .
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Iranian human rights records which has been in the centre of attention 
for quite long has allegedly been exacerbating in the last few years
especially following the disputed 2009 Iranian presidential election.  
4-2-2. Sanctions:
The US has imposed several sanctions on Iran since early 1980s. The 
initial precedents were sanctions regarding weaponry which were 
continually imposed throughout the 1980s when Iran was fighting a war 
against its neighbour Iraq. In 1990s the American congress tried to limit 
the ability of many international financial institutions in granting loans to 
Iran. The best known unilateral sanctions against Iran were legislated in 
the American Congress in an act entitled Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in 
1996, better known as the D'Amato-Kennedy Act. The act, which was 
criticised by many states for its extraterritorial nature, aimed to punish 
all companies and persons, American or not, who invest more than 40 
million dollars in the Iranian energy sector and, therefore, increase Iran’s 
ability to develop its petroleum resources . The sanctions have 
intensified and have proliferated much beyond the American borders.
Since 2005 there have been a number of Security Council resolutions 
which put sanctions on the Iranian economy as well. In the last few 
months, there have also been unilateral sanctions complementing UN 
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Security Council sanctions adopted by other nations such as Canada, 
Japan, Korea to name a few.
It seems that despite continual denial on the part of Iranian officials, 
sanctions have taken a serious toll on the Iranian economy and have 
particularly served to deprive Iran of  much of the foreign investment it 
needs especially in its energy sector which most sanctions have
incidentally  addressed. 
4-2-3.Political instability: 
In the last 30 years different governments in Iran have had sharply 
different attitudes towards foreign investment. Given the complicated 
nature of the Iranian regime, this creates a lack of stability for foreign 
nationals who are considering making investments in Iran. Despite the 
fact that there is a law concerning foreign investment in Iran, foreign 
investment has been viewed very differently by different administrations. 
For instance, the reformists who were in power from 1997 to 2005 put 
forth their best effort to attract foreign investment, whereas the 
conservatives, now in power, do not view foreign investment as a 
necessarily positive thing. These differences of opinion could be 
potentially very damaging to the interests of foreign investors who may 
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be victimized by domestic political competitions.118 This, in itself, could 
be a discouragement for those planning to make investments in Iran.
4.3. Economic impediments:
The most important challenges faced by investors initially is that there is 
no specific economic policy in Iran that can withstand the test of time. In 
fact, as has been the case in the last 30 years, with the change of 
governments, even the most fundamental of economic programs in Iran 
might be subject to change depending on the stance of the new 
government.
In Iran governmental and quasi-governmental organizations play a 
defining role in the economy even today that many parts of the economy 
are supposed to be managed by the private sector. In fact, many 
supposedly private companies are organs related to the government 
under private cover. This in itself could serve as an impediment for the 
really independent private sector to grow and succeed. Other problems 
that can possibly be caused by such interference are a lack of 
transparency, a harmful monopoly on market information and 
preferential treatments favouring companies linked to the government.
                                                
118
“Problems, Impediments and Risks of Foreign Investment in Iran”[in Persian], BoursNegar, 16 
June 2007 http://boursenegar.com/newsdetail-fa-2119.html.
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However, it seems as the privatization in Iran, following changes to 
article 44 of the constitution, expedites, these problems are expected to 
be resolved automatically.
Business happens in a legal context and necessitates an up-to-date legal 
framework. The most important law governing business in Iran is 
Commercial Code. Iranian Commercial code is very old and has not 
been updated for long years 119 , which means there are severe 
shortcomings concerning numerous economic areas namely copyright 
rules, marine trade, stock market, banking,  insurances and etc.120
A study carried out by the Research centre of the Islamic Parliament of 
Iran cites the non-liberal, oil reliant and non-competitive nature of the 
Iranian economy as the main reason why government attempts to attract 
investment have not met with success.121
The reason for the non-competitive nature of the Iranian economy could 
reach beyond economics and may even be to an extent cultural. ‘For 
competition to start and continue in a market, there needs to exist the 
infrastructure, culture and necessary regulations. In many developed 
countries there have been competition laws for as long as one hundred 
                                                
119 The Iranian Commercial Code is an adaptation of  The French Commercial Code which dates back 
to 1807 which is over 200 years ago. There has been very little change in the law since its adaptation 
in 1930s.
120 Abbas Karim Zadeh.,  “Some of the Impediments to Production and Investment in Iran”
121 Resalat newspaper, no 6011, page 16, 24/8/85.
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years turning competition into a familiar and tangible concept. Sherman 
act in the United States, for example, was passed in 1890. What makes 
competition extremely difficult to arise on itself out of privatization and 
market reform in Iran is that it is an alien concept that has never played 
any part in the country’s economy because of the role of the state in the 
economy. There has never existed a single competition law in Iran and 
the first ever independent committee entrusted with the task of drafting 
one has formed only very recently. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect 
competition to easily result from market reforms to the extent observed 
in developed countries and it, obviously, requires more time and energy 
in Iran’122
Another very important reason cited by the mentioned centre has been 
very high economic risks in Iran reaching a staggering 59 percent123.
Administrative corruption and bureaucracy could also turn into serious 
barriers interfering with the legitimate activities of foreign investors. In 
such a bureaucratic system with little government supervision, 
companies which are willing to make investments might be subject to 
discrimination. This might have to do with rent seeking of the 
                                                
122 Nima nasrollahi Shahri, “Power Market Reforms and Privatization of the Electricity
Industry in the Iranian Energy Sector; an Uphill Struggle?” MPRA working paper.
123 ibid.
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individuals involved in the administrative system of the country.124 The 
under development of infrastructures is yet another danger threatening 
foreign investors; it is obvious that a certain level of economic
infrastructures is essential for the success or even operation of many 
foreign companies. Two areas in which there are serious shortcomings 
are communication and transportation.  
Fluctuations in the rate of foreign currencies could also bring about 
undesirable consequences for foreign investors. In the case of a sudden 
and massive increase in the rate of exchange for dollars, the foreign 
investors might make losses when transferring its capital or profits 
abroad.
4-4.Legal impediments: 
4-4-1.Constitutional law:
 There are a number of articles relevant to foreign investment in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Constitutional law of 1980. ‘According to 
                                                
124 “Problems, impediments and risks of foreign investment in Iran”.
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Article 44 of the 1979 Constitution, all the mother industries are owned 
and controlled by the state. This article in fact indicated the 
nationalization of all major industries in the sense that private ownership 
in these industries were disallowed after the Islamic revolution. However,
privatization of most mother industries became legally feasible later on
through legislation125, with the petroleum industry remaining an
exception. Thus, even now, the petroleum industry cannot be privatized
like, for example, the electricity sector. In fact, Article 44 of the
Constitution not only forbids any form of private ownership but also
prohibits private participation i.e. investment, be it foreign or domestic
since it uses the words “owned and controlled by the state”. The 1987
Petroleum law takes the same policy and explicitly declares foreign
investment illegal.’ 126
However, there have been amendments made to it especially to facilitate 
privatization. These amendments were mainly done to start a 
privatization program which is now under way. It should be noted that 
these amendments excluded petroleum reserves and still foreign direct 
investment in the petroleum industry is not legally feasible. Buy-back 
                                                
125 . General Policies of Article 44 of The Constitution of The Islamic Republic Of Iran,
Exigency Council, 2005.
126 Nima Nasrollahi Shahri, “The petroleum legal frame work of Iran”.
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agreements have been used in the last fifteen years as a mechanism to 
absorb the needed foreign funding. However, realistically, this 
mechanism has met only with resounding success. Another important 
article is article 81 of the Constitution which reads: 
“The granting of concessions to foreigners on the formation of 
companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, 
service, or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.”127
This article can be interpreted in three different ways128. Some believe it 
amounts to a complete prohibition of the establishment of any foreign 
company in Iran. Another view is that as long as the majority of shares 
are held by Iranian nationals there should be no problem. An alternative 
interpretation is that article 81 restricts the prohibitions solely to 
concessions and maintains that if the word concession is not used there 
would be no legal ban. Seemingly, the FIPPA favours the latter stance. 
Further pragmatic amendments to the Iranian constitution deem essential 
at this stage.
                                                
127 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, Art 81.
128 Frajollah Afifi.  “Impediments to Foreign Direct Investment in Iran”.
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4-4-2.Labour law:
 The Iranian Labour law was validated at a time when there was an 
immensely protective attitude towards the labour force129. And, therefore, 
the whole foundation of this law is built upon a conflict of interest 
between the labourer and the employee which can by no means be 
conducive to the security of investment, be that foreign or domestic.130
One of the main problems concern dismissal of workers; employers will 
have considerable difficulties and face several restrictions when they 
intend to fire their employees if their performance is not satisfactory. 
Even when fired, many employees are able to get back to work against 
their employers’ will through using legal means. This has pushed 
domestic employers to have annual contracts with their labour force so 
as to be able to discard them once the year is over. Another challenge 
particularly facing foreign investors is obtainment of work permit for 
foreign workers which requires going through a very rigorous procedure 
considering the protective nature of the Iranian law for Iranian workforce. 
                                                
129 “Problems, Impediments and Risks of Foreign Investment in Iran”.
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Ghani Nejad, Mousa, Navab, Mahdi “The Challenges of Foreign Investment in Iran”[in Persian] , 
2001,  http://www.csr.ir/Center.aspx?lng=fa&abtid=06&&nxtid=14.
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4-4-3.Encouragement of foreign investment law(FIPPA): 
This law has indeed filled many of the voids that used to exist in the 
Iranian legal frame work before its legislation. However, there are  still 
subjects within this law which could be modified. As an example, as 
mentioned previously, based on the Iranian domestic law, foreign 
nationals are unable to possess immovable property. This has been 
reaffirmed in the FIPPA. This can disincentive the prospective investors 
and is much less favourable when compared with many other countries. 
However, companies registered in Iran could own immovable property 
which can solve this problem to a limited extent. Another pitfall is the 
limitations set for the proportion of foreign investment in different 
economic sectors. However understandable the logic behind this may 
appear, such limitations are typically set by countries which are 
inundated by foreign investment and are thinking of directing this 
investment to more desirable fields and not by countries like Iran which 
suffer from a massive shortage.
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Conclusion and recommendations: 
Like many other countries in Asia such as South Korea, Iran started its 
industrialization plans in the 1970s. The plans were initially much faster 
and more successful than those of its peers131, mainly because of the 
Iranian huge natural resources endowment.  As part of the scheme and to 
meet the lack of domestic financial resources the country began using 
foreign investment. However, there was a massive and abrupt change of 
attitude towards economics after the 1979 revolution. The revolutionary 
climate of the country along with the war served to bring the 
industrialization program as well as the attraction of foreign investment 
to a complete halt. This trend continued for more than 10 years. 
However, since the beginning of 1990s when more pragmatic 
governments came into power there have been attempts to get the 
economy back on track and foreign investment has obviously been an 
indispensable option. Ever since 1996, the country has reformed its 
domestic legal framework for investment and has concluded many 
international treaties to encourage the flow of FDI into the country. 
There has been some investment in Iran in the last 15 years. However, 
                                                
131 Hossein Askari, The Iranian economy, “Part 1: Iran’s Slide to the Bottom”, Asia Times online , 
Sep 15, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LI15Ak01.html.
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they have been far from international standards for a country of the size 
and natural resources of Iran and have proved clearly insufficient for the 
development programs of the country. 
As discussed earlier, there is consensus among economists that provided 
certain conditions foreign investment contributes to the economic growth 
of a country. It is a well-trodden path taken by many countries. There 
have also been numerous studies that signify international treaties can 
help attract foreign investment given they are concluded with the right 
countries. 
In the case of Iran, it can be claimed that the attempts have only partly 
paid off, but despite the increase in foreign investment the records are 
less than satisfactory. The growth rate of investment has consistently 
been higher throughout periods when more treaties were concluded. In 
other words, governments have always been greeted with increases in 
foreign investment when adopting a more positive attitude towards the 
matter. 
However, it should not be forgotten that since the year 2000, there have 
been many reforms made to the Iranian legal and fiscal framework for 
investment and the increase has happened in such a context. Therefore, 
establishing a causal link between international treaties and foreign 
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investment in Iran demands more attention and could not be dealt with 
within the scope of a study of this nature. 
However, it appears that for a country like Iran economic openness and 
political compromise are more important factors than domestic or 
international efforts of a completely legal nature. As to bilateral treaties, 
the vast majority of the Iranian treaties are concluded with developing 
countries and underdeveloped countries which do not tend to be 
particularly capital exporting. It seems realistic to recommend that there 
should be more treaties concluded with OECD countries. In addition, 
having no economic relationships with the United States, the biggest 
economy of the world, has deprived Iran of an important investment 
source and has, in turn, taken its toll on the Iranian economy as far as 
financing is concerned. This has recently even worsened as the 
relationship between Iran and many other economic giants such as 
Germany, France and the UK is turning sour.
The problem of foreign investment in Iran seems to be overwhelmingly 
political; logically, for a political problem one should devise a political 
solution. The economic sanctions, a significant impediment for 
investment in Iran, have been imposed on Iran for purely political and 
partly ideological reasons. After the rise of President Ahmadi Nejad in 
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2005, the ideological and political tensions between Iran and the west 
have been heightened and the ideological differences are arguably deeper. 
It appears that ideology and politics come before economics on the 
Iranian regime agenda and national interest is not as economically 
defined as it is for the majority of countries. Politics and economics are 
inseparable especially in a country like Iran while the economic policies 
of Iran132 appear to be incongruous with its political stances. As a result, 
the economy is usually, at least as far as international relationships are 
concerned, overshadowed by politics and ideology. This may have to do 
with its huge oil and gas resources and the fact that, given the high oil 
prices, the government has a huge, constant and guaranteed income 
regardless of international political developments. 
From a political perspective, an important misunderstanding to be 
cleared as soon as possible is the Iranian contentious nuclear program. 
Once this problem is solved, there is a much higher likelihood for Iran to 
succeed in attracting investment in the absence of international economic 
sanctions. At this stage, it is very difficult to make any speculations as to 
the future of investment in the country since it depends largely on the 
                                                
132 Examples of such modern policies are the encouragement of foreign investment and privatization 
of mother industries. In fact the Iranian economy is being modelled on the west while its politics and 
its view towards international law are increasingly becoming more isolated. 
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political developments within Iran and the US ; the next Iranian 
president as well as the next American administration could be key 
determinants.
Legally speaking, as discussed within the body, to enhance the legal 
framework some measures such as amendments to employment law and 
a change in the contractual regime of upstream petroleum agreements 
can be recommended. It seems that the economic climate in the country 
is gradually becoming better and more suited to foreign enterprise; an 
important development to be unfolded in close future is the gradual 
removal of subsidies which can conceivably serve to expedite 
privatization and strengthen the private sector. As well as this, it can take 
a huge burden off the Iranian government shoulder and can probably 
reform the consumption pattern among the Iranian consumer.
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Questions for further studies:
In this study, it was concluded that reforms to the economic and legal 
framework of the country and concluding treaties with other countries 
cannot, on their own, solve the problem of foreign investment in Iran and 
that changes to areas of political significance such as foreign policy seem 
to be inevitably crucial. 
However, because of the limited scope of this study, several questions 
remain unanswered. First and foremost, more studies should be done on 
the impact of concluding treaties with third world countries, which are 
not particularly capital exporting, on the amount of investment 
channelled to Iran. It should be investigated if these treaties are worth the 
cost the country undergoes to conclude them if they are only friendly 
gestures aiming to strengthen political ties with no investment related 
implications. 
Considering the new economic developments in Iran, it should be very 
interesting to study the effects of the removal of subsidies on foreign 
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investment. Heavy subsidization of energy and some consumer goods in 
Iran had been considered by many scholars as an important impediment 
in the way of privatization and liberalization of the economy and now 
that subsidies are to become history, studying the potential effects of this 
massive economic program on foreign investment requires academic 
attention.
On the political side, whether Iran can succeed in taking its development 
path without making fundamental changes to its foreign policy i.e., its 
relationship with the west, requires more in depth analysis in a more 
political context. However, it should be mentioned that such a study 
involves much speculation and, therefore, is not likely to lead to 
conclusive results. This is especially true given the importance of 
political changes, which incidentally seem to be occurring at a much 
rapider pace than ever before globally, and the way they unfold for the 
fate of Iran and its rivals, one may say enemies. 
If the present trend is to continue, the author believes that more studies 
should be done on alternatives to foreign investment as far as the 
development of the petroleum resources is concerned. Alternatively, 
adopting a more attractive contractual regime such as a classic 
production sharing regime for development of petroleum reserves can be
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an option worth considering.  It can be speculated that oil may lose its 
current relevance in some decades and so Iran should consider 
expanding its production capacity to maximize profits as long as each 
barrel of oil can fetch a price much higher than its production cost 
leaving enormous rent for the country.
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